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Summary 
Many Central and East European countries are currently re-arranging their regional levels of 
public administration. The country studies compiled in this paper analyse administrative de-
centralisation and the re-creation of regional administrative bodies in Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. They attempt to give a detailed picture of the 
regional level, its development and structure as well as the objectives, implementation and 
outcomes of administrative reforms. The main motives of reform are to create links between 
local self-government and central government, de-politicize the administration and prepare for 
EU accession. While these factors had a certain homogenising effect on reform outcomes, the 
interplay of different historical legacies, policy approaches and regionalist phenomena result-
ed in cross-national differences.  
The introduction of this paper tries to relate these variables to reform outcomes and gives a 
structured overview on the developments. Particular attention is paid to the policy of the Eu-
ropean Union in the pre-accession constellation. The Commission and the pre-accession 
framework appear to become catalysts for a process in which Central and East European re-
gions increase their political salience. Although the Commission has deliberately avoided to 
urge for a comprehensive regionalisation, its indirect impact should not be underestimated and 
resembles the catalytic impact of European integration on the re-emergence of regions in 
Western Europe. 
 
The study is part of a project on the integration of Central and East European countries into 
the European Union, which is jointly managed by the Bertelsmann Science Foundation and 
the Research Group on European Affairs at the Centre for Applied Policy Research. The coun-
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Re-creating the regional level in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: An analysis of administrative reforms  
in six countries 
MARTIN BRUSIS 
Introduction
1
 
Many Central and East European countries (CEEC) are currently re-arranging 
their intermediate or regional levels of public administration. Public attention and 
political debate have mainly focused on the territorial changes linked to the new 
administrative bodies. In Poland and Slovakia, for example, the number and 
boundaries of vojvodships and kraj were highly controversial among politicians. 
While the territorial aspects of regional administration reforms have become the 
most visible issues, the core problems of the reforms are democratic accountabil-
ity and effective governance. In the framework of their joint project on the integra-
tion of Central and East European countries into the European Union, the Ber-
telsmann Science Foundation and the Centre for Applied Policy Research have 
initiated six country studies which analyse administrative decentralisation and the 
re-creation of regional administrative bodies in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The studies which are compiled in this paper 
attempt to give detailed analyses of the regional level, its development and struc-
ture as well as the objectives, implementation and outcomes of administrative re-
forms. Other CEEC will be taken as occasional examples but could not be includ-
ed into this study due to organisational and financial reasons.  
Reforms of regional administration are driven by three main motives. First, re-
gional administrative bodies constitute "missing links" in the entire structure of 
public administration which have not been touched by the public sector reforms 
implemented since 1990. After the political transition, the newly established dem-
ocratic governments and parliaments focused on the establishment of local self-
governments and local political elites with democratic legitimacy. This led to ac-
countable and relatively autonomous local self-governments which were, howev-
er, often not appropriately embedded into the existing state administration at the 
local, regional and central level. The current reforms are undertaken to adapt and 
harmonise the existing state and self-governmental administration.  
Second, administrative reforms aim at overcoming the authoritarian legacy of state 
administration which consisted of the strong influence of political criteria on deci-
sions, the proficiency deficits of civil servants, the restricted professional autono-
my of administrative bodies, the absence of detailed legal regulation guiding ad-
ministrative action and the discretionary application of legal regulations (Goetz 
1995; Hesse 1993; OECD-CCET 1996; Wollmann 1995; 1997). Struggling to 
improve professionalism and the rule of law, reformers at first perceived regional 
administrative bodies more as an obstacle to democratisation and a legacy of au-
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  The author would like to express his thanks to Eric von Breska, Claus Giering, Lisa Mayerho-
fer, Wim van Meurs and the contributors to this volume for their valuable comments and in-
formation which allowed to collect and fit the single pieces of information into a comparative 
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thoritarian rule than as an intermediary level facilitating local and regional self-
government. This perception, the intrinsic complexity of administrative reform, 
and the crowded general political agenda explain why the CEEC have postponed 
changes on the regional level until now.  
Third, the prospect of accession to the European Union has induced the CEE gov-
ernments to carry on with administration reform because accession candidates are 
required to have the administrative capacities for the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire and, in particular, for the management of EU structural funds. In 
its structural policy, the European Commission attaches great importance to re-
gions as units participating in the design and implementation of development 
strategies and plans. The requirements of accession are incentives for governments 
to create appropriate regional units.  
While it was clear that a modern public administration should comprise state ad-
ministration and sub-national self-governments on the local and regional level, the 
exact meaning of the notion of "public" has not yet been conceptually clarified in 
most of the CEEC. The outcomes of the current reforms also delineate this notion 
more precisely and thus will shape the profile of the public sector in each acces-
sion country for the future. In summarising the country studies of this volume and 
other available sources, this introduction tries to map differences and similarities 
among the institutional arrangements of these countries. It discusses various ex-
planations for the outcomes of reform in order to understand better the rationales 
behind institutional choices and the national "policy styles" or "administrative 
cultures". The impact of the European Union is scrutinised, considering implica-
tions the administrative reforms entail for the pre-accession policy of the EU.  
1. Institutional differences and similarities 
Up to now, administrative reforms have progressed to a different extent in each 
country, leading to institutional arrangements which are still in a state of flux. An 
important condition and constraint of the reforms is that all the countries studied 
in this paper define themselves as unitary states. Only the Czech Republic and 
Poland have a second parliamentary chamber representing regional interests.
2
 As a 
by-product of the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1992, the Czech 
Senate was established in order to ensure representation for deputies of the Feder-
al Parliament (Ziemer 1996: 156). The Polish Senate was created by the Round-
Table Agreement of 1989. While half of the Sejm mandates were guaranteed for 
the Polish Communist Party, only the Senate had full democratic legitimacy dur-
ing the first years of transition. The Polish Senate is composed of two or three 
deputies per vojvodship which are elected according to party lists. Both the Czech 
and the Polish second chamber have not yet finally found their role within the 
emerging new administrative set-up. Their necessity is questioned, the public does 
not pay much attention to these institutions, and Senate elections in both countries 
usually have very low turnouts. 
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  Apart from the Czech Republic and Poland, Romania and Slovenia are the only states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe which have second chambers in their parliaments. While the Romanian 
Senate represents the regions, the Slovenian Senate is an institution of functional interest repre-
sentation with representatives from employees' and employers' associations and other organisa-
tions of civil society, similar to the Bavarian Senate (cf. Ziemer 1996: 155-157).  
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To date, Bulgaria and Estonia are the only countries which have not established 
legal prerequisites for self-governments at the regional level. Counties are an inte-
gral part of the state administration in both countries, although county assemblies 
in Estonia facilitate a participation of the delegates of local self-governments at 
the regional level. In the other four countries studied here, county institutions are 
considered as self-governments and as institutionally independent bodies of public 
law, performing self-governmental as well as state administrative tasks. This dual 
function is expressed by the dual institutional structure of the county level, con-
sisting of a state representative (governor, vojvod, head of office) and of a self-
governing organ (assembly, parliament).  
While county self-governments are already working in Hungary and Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia up to now have adopted only the legal provisions on 
county self-governments. Hungarian county assemblies already have a certain tra-
dition, since they were elected directly by citizens in 1994 and for a second term 
in 1998. In contrast, the first direct elections to Polish vojvodship assemblies took 
place in October 1998. 
One should take into account that the size of the regional administrative bodies in 
the six countries studied here varies considerably. The newly established Polish 
vojvodships are by far the biggest units with an average population of 2,416,000 
inhabitants and an average territory of 19544 km². This may explain why Poland 
has decided to introduce a subregional level of directly elected district self-
governments, too. Hungarian and the new Slovak and Czech counties range be-
tween 537,000 and 737,000 inhabitants, Bulgarian counties are approximately half 
as big, and counties in Estonia have roughly the same size as districts in Poland 
(103,000 inhabitants). Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia increased the 
number of regional administrative units from 9 to 28 (January 1999), 8 to 14 (Oc-
tober 1997) and 4 to 8 (July 1996). Estonia and Hungary have up to now main-
tained their inherited administrative-territorial division of 15 (19) counties. In 
Hungary the first democratically elected government tried to introduce Commis-
sioners of the Republic as regional representatives of government which implied a 
certain revision of the county structure since the commissioners' territorial respon-
sibility was divided into eight regions. Only Poland reduced the number of voj-
vodships from 49 to 16 in June 1998, but this reduction was supplemented by the 
creation of a new tier of 308 self-governed districts.  
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia are currently planning to create larger regions in 
order to have territorial units corresponding with the level of NUTS-2 in the cur-
rent EU member states.
3
 NUTS-2 regions of EU member states have an average 
population of 1.8 million and an average territory of 15700 km² and participate in 
the structural policy of the EU (cf. section 3 below). The legal status of the envis-
aged regions is still subject to discussion in these countries. While the new Polish 
vojvodships match the NUTS-2 level in size, the Czech Government has, in addi-
tion to the envisaged 14 counties, created eight statistical regions which would be 
NUTS-2 compatible. 
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  The territories of EU member states are divided into five statistical units according to the so-
called ”Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques” (NUTS). For example, the German 
Bundesländer belong to NUTS-1 and the Regierungsbezirke constitute NUTS-2. This classifi-
cation is not stipulated in European Community law, but it is used in the regulation on the struc-
tural funds and by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat). 
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Since specific and comparable data is missing and the scope of regional govern-
ment has not yet been fully defined in most countries, the policy areas belonging 
to regional governments can not be compared here. The country studies of this 
volume indicate that supervisory powers are regulated very similarly in all coun-
tries. As a rule, local self-governments may deal with all local public affairs which 
are not explicitly assigned to the state administration or higher levels of self-
government, based upon a law. Apart from this encompassing competence, local 
self-governments carry out tasks of state administration which are transferred to 
them (transferred competences).
4
 Usually the representative of the state admin-
istration at the county level exercises (only) the legal supervision of county (in 
Poland also district) and local self-governments, and specialised audit offices en-
sure a financial control.  
With respect to transferred competences, this supervision is extended to matters of 
factual correctness, professionalism and appropriateness and is exercised also by 
sectoral state administration or sectoral ministries. Those countries which have 
already established (and are establishing) regional self-governments, tried to re-
frain from subordinating local (and, in Poland, district) self-governments to the 
new regional self-governments. The general intention of the reformers was to 
avoid a re-centralisation of powers; rather, regional self-governments usually have 
received (and are to receive) competences of existing state administrative bodies. 
Deconcentrated sectoral state administration has been integrated into the general 
territorial state administration to a different extent in each country. According to 
the available information, the Polish vojvodship reform has resulted in a high de-
gree of organisational integration, whereas sectoral state administration is most 
clearly separated from territorial state administration and local self-government in 
the Slovak and Czech Republics (Gadomska in this volume; Koudelka 1995). 
Hungary and Estonia appear to have established more coordinating institutions 
between self-government, territorial and sectoral state administration compared 
with the other countries.  
The district level of administration between the county and the local self-
governments differs strongly across the countries studied here, resulting from the 
different state of progress, and the different national concepts, of administrative 
reform. On the one hand, Estonia and Hungary have no districts as a level of pub-
lic administration; state administrative tasks are carried out either by local self-
governments or by counties. On the other hand, Poland has just introduced self-
governed districts (powiaty) with directly elected assemblies and heads of districts 
elected by the district assemblies. Bulgaria, the Czech and the Slovak Republic 
also have a district level of administration which involves local self-governments 
to a different extent, although belonging to state administration. 
Since Czechoslovak reformers abolished the large regions created by the com-
munist regime quickly after the political transition, leaving an institutional void at 
the regional level, district offices of territorial state administration and district-
level bodies of deconcentrated sectoral state administration have kept and gained 
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  This distinction is a simplifying generalisation of the distinctions between "independent" and 
"transferred" competences in the Czech Republic, "own" and "delegated" powers in Poland, 
"mandatory" and "voluntary" tasks in Hungary etc., each of which has a different status within 
the legal-administrative system of the respective country (Cf. Baldersheim et al. 1996: 28). 
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importance. In contrast to the Czech Republic, Slovakia possessed a sub-district 
level of state administration (obvod) until 1996, when it was re-integrated into the 
district administration. In both countries there is an ongoing debate about the fu-
ture role of districts after the establishment of regional self-governments, and 
some participants have even proposed to dissolve districts, shifting their tasks to 
the municipal or county level. Both countries had some form of institutionalised 
local self-government representation in the state administration already before the 
legislation on self-governed counties was passed. Until 1992, mayors in Slovakia 
elected the head of the subdistrict office, and in the Czech Republic district as-
semblies composed of delegates from local self-governments decided on budget 
transfers to municipalities. 
Contrary to the regional level, local government reform was perceived as a priority 
of democratisation by the new political elites in Central and Eastern Europe (cf. 
Baldersheim et al. 1996). Immediately after the political transition the newly 
elected parliaments and governments established statutes of local self-
governments and held local elections. The Czech and Slovak Republics, Estonia 
and Hungary have since then experienced a fragmentation of local self-
governments into smaller units. Small settlements chose to become independent as 
a reaction to the former state socialist policies aiming at the integration and cen-
tralisation of municipalities. These initiatives were supported by regulations of 
local self-government funding which provided incentives for municipalities to 
constitute themselves as independent units. Partly as a consequence of this inde-
pendence movement, the newly established voluntary associations of municipali-
ties became important intermediaries in Slovakia and Estonia. There is scarcely 
any comparative data on the financial resources of local and regional self-
governments. According to the European Commission‘s country progress reports, 
all CEE local self-governments are highly dependent on transfers from the central 
state budget. State budget transfers amount to 66 % of local government revenues 
in the Czech Republic (85 % in Poland). 
The polities of local self-governments reflect a certain North-South difference 
which may also be found in Western Europe (Page 1991; Baldersheim et al. 1996: 
40-41; Bullmann/Goldsmith/Page 1997). While mayors in the Southern countries 
are elected directly by the local communities, in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
the Baltic countries mayors are elected by local councils and share more powers 
with executive boards. The fact that mayors thus have a stronger political position 
in Southern countries of Central and Eastern Europe indicates that these countries 
seem to exhibit traits of a "broker" model of local self-government with strong 
elements of partisan politics and local lobbying at the central level. A broker mod-
el requires a strong political position of mayors, enabling them to control their 
constituencies and to bargain with state authorities. In contrast, the Baltic coun-
tries and the Czech Republic seem to lean towards a "service" model with its em-
phasis on legal governance, functional differentiation and consensual politics.
5
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  Albeit mayors in Poland are elected by local councils, its political culture of strong civic en-
gagement and the generally high political status of local government issues do not correspond 
to a ”service model”. 
  
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovak Republic 
second 
chamber of 
Parliament 
- Senate (81 seats, directly 
elected); participation of 
Senate deputies in county 
self-governments discussed 
- - Senate (100 seats, directly 
elected in vojvodships 
according to party lists) 
second chamber as a repre-
sentation of county self-
governments discussed 
county 
level 
28 counties since 1/1999, 
(av. 317000 inh., 3964 
km²); bodies of state ad-
ministration; county gover-
nor appointed by govern-
ment; 
14 counties (av. 737000 
inh., 5633 km²), independ-
ent bodies of public law, 
assembly directly elected 
by citizens for four years, 
starting from 2000/2001; 
may submit bills to the 
Parliament 
15 counties (av. 103000 
inh., 3015 km²), bodies of 
state administration; county 
assembly of delegates of 
local self-governments; 
county governor appointed 
by government; self-
governmental functions of 
counties transferred to local 
self-gov. in 1990-92 
19 counties (av. 537000 
inh., 4895 km²), independ-
ent bodies of public law; 
assembly directly elected 
by citizens for four years, 
since 1994 (1. 12/94, 2. 
11/98), assembly elects 
president; county public 
administrative office since 
1994, heads app. by gov. 
16 vojvodships (av. 2.416 
m inh., 19544 km²), inde-
pendent bodies of public 
law, assembly directly 
elected by citizens, since 
1999 (1. 10/98); vojvod 
appointed by government 
8 counties (av. 672000 inh., 
6129 km²), independent 
bodies of public law, as-
sembly directly elected by 
citizens, since 1996  ¸county 
office of state administra-
tion 
district-
level 
279 districts; district gov-
ernor appointed by county 
governor, district assembly 
composed of delegates of 
local self-governments 
77 districts; head of district 
office appointed by 
government; district as-
sembly of delegates of 
local self-governments 
no district administration, 
state administrative tasks 
performed by local self-
governments, their volun-
tary associations and coun-
ties 
no districts as bodies of 
public administration, state 
administrative tasks per-
formed by local self-
governments and counties 
372 districts; district as-
sembly elected directly; 
state-administrative dis-
tricts (rejon) 1990-1998 
79 districts, no institutional 
participation of local self-
governments; 121 sub-
districts (obvod) dissolved 
in 1996; head of sub-
district office elected by 
mayors until 1992 
deconcen-
trated state 
administra-
tion 
most sectoral administra-
tion separate from county 
administration 
influential sectoral state 
administration, separate 
from self-governments 
most sectoral administra-
tion integrated into county 
administration 
most sectoral administra-
tion separated from county 
administration 
since 1999 most sectoral 
administration integrated 
into county administration 
influential sectoral state 
administration, separate 
from self-governments 
local self-
govern-
ments 
4032; mayors elected di-
rectly, 4-year term 
6242; mayors elected by 
council, 4-year term 
253; mayors elected by 
council, 3-year term; strong 
autonomy; strong role of 
municipalities‘ associations 
3071; mayors elected di-
rectly in small municipali-
ties (<10000), by council in 
larger municipalities; 4-
year term; strong legal and 
financial autonomy 
2459; mayors appointed by 
council, 4-year term 
ca. 3335; mayors elected 
directly, 4-year term; strong 
role of municipalities‘ as-
sociations 
NUTS-2 
regions 
 8 statistical regions since 
12/1998, corresponding 
regional committees of 
delegates from local self-
gov., county self-gov. and 
interest associations 
government plans to estab-
lish 5-7 counties corre-
sponding to NUTS-2 
government plans to estab-
lish 7 regions as self-
governmental and state 
administrative units 
 establishment of 4 regions 
as units of state administra-
tion discussed 
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2. Explanatory variables 
The overview of the preceding section has shown that administrative reforms in 
the Central and East European countries display striking similarities in their gen-
eral orientation, key functions and problem structures. Since the main motives of 
institutional reform, i.e. creating links between local self-government and central 
government, de-politicizing the administration and preparing for EU accession, 
have been present in all the CEEC, they had a certain homogenising effect on re-
form outcomes. This section tries to go beyond this general observation and con-
siders which constellation of explanatory variables may account for particular sim-
ilarities and differences of policy outcomes in the countries of this study. Chosing 
an inductive approach to structure the variance, one may distinguish three main 
variables: Historical legacies which provide institutional constraints for the pro-
tagonists of administrative reform and influence their choices; policy approaches, 
i.e. sets of beliefs and ideas guiding parties, politicians and experts; and the role of 
historical/ethnic regionalism for the political context and the outcomes of re-
forms.
6
 Such a comparison has to cope with the methodological problem of 
”overdetermination” (Crawford/Lijphart 1995), i.e. the difficulty of isolating "de-
cisive" causes among various independent variables with similar effects on several 
dependent variables. Therefore the aim of the following section is more modest: 
namely to explore the explanatory value of different factors and relate them to 
each other.  
Legacies 
Historical legacies constitute important framework conditions under which admin-
istrative decentralisation is being implemented. Comparative political research on 
administrative decentralisation in East-central Europe distinguishes between pre-
socialist, socialist and transition legacies of state administration (Wollmann 1995; 
1997; Illner 1997; cf. on legacies in general: Crawford/Lijphart 1995). An im-
portant pre-socialist legacy is the dualist model of public administration, dating 
back to the Reichsgemeindegesetz of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
(1862). According to this model which was applied in the Czech lands, Hungary 
and Galicia, bodies of territorial administration performed functions of both self-
government and state administration. They had own and transferred competences 
and they were responsible both to local councils and higher administrative bodies 
(Illner 1997:16). After 1989, the dualist model influenced the conceptual thinking 
on administrative reform in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland since reforms of 
the regional level were framed as questions of how to balance elements of state 
administration and self-government. Lacking the legacy of dualism, the Estonian 
                                                 
6
  In his account of the territorial dimension of public administration reform in East Central Eu-
rope, Illner (1997: 12) distinguishes four ”contextual factors” which have influenced reform 
outcomes: pre-communist and communist legacies, the political context of the reforms, the ex-
pectations toward decentralisation and geographic/demographic factors. Hesse (1997: 121) 
identifies six explanatory concepts for public sector reform outcomes: stages of development 
like transformation, modernisation etc., cultural traditions, institutional variables, the given re-
source base, the degree of reform professionalisation, and policy entrepreneurship or political 
will. The explanatory variables discussed here resemble these factors to some extent but the ar-
ticle tries to spell out more detailed cause-effect relations. 
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reform of administration has both entrusted local self-governments and their asso-
ciations with a greater range of tasks, assigned county governments to the state 
administration and seems to rely more on consensual and informal mechanisms of 
co-ordination at the regional and central level.  
Apart from the mentioned authoritarian legacies of state socialist administration 
which posed challenges to the reformers, the territorial organisation of the states at 
the outset of transition represents an important state socialist legacy. In an attempt 
to modernise and centralise state administration, already the state socialist gov-
ernments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had embarked on reforms of the 
administrative division of their territories. Czechoslovakia reduced the number of 
districts and counties and centralised competences in 1960. With its reforms of 
1975, the Polish government abolished district level bodies of administration and 
increased the number of vojvodships from 17 to 49 (Taras 1993: 22-23). In 1984, 
Hungary also abolished its districts and shifted competences to the county level. A 
major aim of the measures was to re-divide administrative units in order to destroy 
traditional regional networks and loyalties (Illner 1997: 13).  
Due to the power-stabilising political intentions linked to the earlier state socialist 
reforms, the new democratically elected governments perceived regional level 
administrative bodies as relicts of authoritarian rule. As a consequence, Czecho-
slovak reformers in 1990 decided to dissolve the county level bodies in order to 
strengthen the autonomy of local self-governments. While this was facilitated by 
the persistence of an established district level state administration, Hungarian re-
formers who were faced with the same option of dissolving the county level ad-
ministration could not presuppose a separate district level tier. The Polish gov-
ernment also refrained from dissolving the vojvodship level but re-introduced a 
district level in 1990 (rejon) which corresponded to the old district units of the 
pre-1975 period. 
A different legacy results from the fact that Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Estonia 
had orthodox state socialist systems until 1989, while the pre-transitional state 
socialist systems of Poland and Hungary are better described as liberalising au-
thoritarian regimes. The latter two countries thus could draw from a longer con-
ceptual debate on administrative decentralisation and local self-government. The 
Solidarność  movement in Poland had traditionally emphasised local self-
government as an important dimension of civil society and an instrument to build 
democracy (cf. e.g. Benzler 1994). Accordingly, in 1991 the National Assembly of 
Self-governments proposed to dissolve the vojvodships and transfer their powers 
to district and local self-governments.  
Reform-socialist Hungarian incumbents and the country‘s mainly intellectual op-
position circles had criticised the county‘s administrative tutelage over municipali-
ties and agreed in the resolve to introduce strong democratic local self-
governments (Cf. e.g. Pálné Kovács 1997a). This may explain why Hungary re-
arranged its regional level institutions immediately after the political transition 
and set up elected regional self-governments already in 1994. Hungary was much 
faster than Poland in implementing reforms because the successive Polish gov-
ernments during the first years after the transition lacked a stable parliamentary 
basis and were to a larger extent preoccupied with consolidating their power. 
Introduction 
9 
Another explanation for the differing progress of reforms refers to the transition 
legacies constituted by the different paths of transition (cf. in general: 
Lynn/Schmitter 1991; O Donnell/Schmitter 1986). Since the Polish transition was 
based upon a negotiated power sharing between Solidarność  and the state social-
ist regime, the Solidarność -led government had to confine itself to the re-
establishment of local self-governments, refraining from a comprehensive reform 
of the vojvodship level (Benzler 1994: 322-323; Illner 1997: 50). In Hungary, the 
early split of the opposition movement in the course of the liberalisation and tran-
sition supported a policy characterised by compromise and incrementalism. As the 
newly elected conservative government and the liberal opposition parties had 
agreed to link the law on local self-government (and other important laws) to the 
support of a two-thirds majority in Parliament, a compromise between the opposi-
tion and the government was required. Expecting to win the municipal elections of 
1990 and thus to gain control over the public administration, the governing coali-
tion parties accepted to weaken the county level and to shift its supervisory func-
tion to newly created Commissioners of the Republic who were, however, restrict-
ed to a merely legal supervision of self-governments (Navracsics 1996: 286-287).  
The velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia provided the citizens' movement of 1989 
with the power and legitimacy to quickly abolish the regional administrative level 
which was considered as one of the strongholds of the ancien regime (Malíková 
/Miháliková 1995; Illner 1997). A similarly strong political legitimacy was de-
rived from the revolutionary path of transition in Estonia. The Estonian govern-
ment thus was able to create strong local self-governments by reducing powers of 
the county level (Mäeltsemees 1998). Since Bulgaria experienced a delayed transi-
tion and the Bulgarian Socialist Party managed to win the first democratic parlia-
mentary elections, the government could implement only gradual and reluctant 
reforms, leaving the county level by and large unchanged. 
Policy approaches 
The presence of legacies in the new administrative structures does not rule out the 
impact of intentional political design, guided by the policy approaches of political 
actors and experts. Among these sets of ideas and beliefs which are shaping the 
political positions specific actors adopt on specific issues, three cleavages seem to 
be particularly relevant for administrative reforms in the CEEC: centralism vs. 
localism, dualism vs. monism and federalism vs. unitarism. The first cleavage 
refers to the division of power between central and local government. A centralist 
approach is in favour of maintaining and / or widening the central government’s 
financial, legal and political control over local activities. A localist approach aims 
at increasing the autonomy of local bodies to regulate public affairs independent 
of the government. While centralism is usually based upon efficiency arguments, 
localism is often justified with democracy and accountability reasons. At the be-
ginning of the transition the political actor coalitions advocating either centralism 
or localism in Central and Eastern Europe reflected the cleavage between post-
socialist parties and parties emerging from the former opposition milieux. Since 
then the composition of localist (centralist) policy coalitions has differed across 
countries and does not correspond to the familiar labels of conservative, liberal 
and social democratic parties either. 
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The dominance of a centralist or localist policy approach is perhaps the most ob-
vious rationale of reform outcomes. The delayed establishment of regional self-
governments in the Czech Republic can be explained with the centralist policy of 
the government of Václav Klaus ruling the Czech Republic and dominating its 
political life until 1997. The Klaus government argued that economic reform 
should be treated as a priority and its implementation should thus not be impeded 
by administrative re-arrangements. Its reluctance to share powers with other actors 
and institutions was rooted in an economic interpretation of civil society which 
differed from Václav Havel's notion of civil society (cf. Hřích/Larischová in this 
volume). The Klaus government questioned the relevance of any intermediary 
political institution in the relationship between state and citizen, including institu-
tionally independent counties (Illner 1997: 40). This principal position was sup-
ported by the argument that only municipalities were legitimate units of territorial 
self-government at the sub-national level. Higher level self-governing entities 
should emerge from the voluntary association of municipalities in a bottom-up 
process, not by the artificial creation of regional bodies from above (cf. Illner 
1997: 51). The centralist policy approach was also reflected in the opposition 
against reorganising the Czechoslovak federation and against institutionalising the 
co-operation between the Visegrád countries. 
In Slovakia, the opposition between centralist and localist policy approaches be-
came one of the main dividing lines in the power struggle between the Mečiar 
government and the opposition parties. The latter tried to strengthen local self-
governments in order to create a countervailing power against the centralisation 
attempts of the government in most spheres of society and politics. When the 
Mečiar government adopted the laws on the creation of eight kraj in 1996, it de-
cided that the territorial-administrative division of the country should precede a 
transfer of powers to the kraj-level self-governments that were to be established 
(Brusis/Nižňanský 1997). It re-designed district and county boundaries largely 
irrespective of the territorial units the municipalities had chosen by forming re-
gional associations. The centralised style of decision-making provided ample op-
portunities to distribute resources according to political loyalties and induced mu-
nicipalities to bargain at the central level. The opposition argued that the govern-
ment did not intend to implement a real decentralisation of powers but rather a 
deconcentration.  
In Hungary the broad localist coalition of mid-1990 relieved the regional adminis-
trative bodies (megye) from their state-administrative and supervisory function 
and confined them to a mainly consultative role, transferring only legal control 
powers to the Commissioners of the Republic (Cf. e.g. Navracsics 1996; Pálné 
Kovács 1997a). As the liberal opposition parties won the municipal elections of 
October 1990, the localist-centralist cleavage re-emerged between local self-
governments and the central government composed of conservative and christian 
democratic parties. The government, faced with this power constellation, trans-
formed the Commissioner of the Republic into a governmental control organ of 
local self-governments and other bodies of state administration (Navracsics 1996: 
286-287). After 1994, the socialist-liberal coalition government abolished the in-
creasingly unpopular institution of the Commissioner and tried to strengthen the 
megye by introducing its direct election and acknowledging it as a territorial self-
government (területi önkormányzat). 
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Supporters of a localist approach in Poland envisaged to transfer state administra-
tion tasks to vojvodship self-governments and to abandon most separate units of 
state administration at the local and regional level. This approach was advocated 
by the National Assembly of Self-Governments and aimed at a far-reaching decen-
tralisation of powers (cf. Instytut Spraw Publicznych 1997). According to the al-
ternative, more centralist approach, vojvodship self-governments should be re-
stricted to tasks of regional development and a separate tier of state administration 
should be maintained. While the parties emerging from the Solidarność  move-
ment advocated a more comprehensive decentralisation, the post-communist par-
ties (SLD and PSL) were reluctant to transfer state powers to vojvodships and did 
not undertake steps to create directly elected vojvodship self-governments during 
their period of government. Since the return of a government affiliated with the 
former Solidarność , the legislative basis of regional self-government has been set 
(cf. Bondyra/Czachór in this volume). Concerns of the major coalition party AWS 
about a too far-reaching decentralisation induced the governing coalition to create 
16 new vojvodships instead of the initially envisaged 12 vojvodships and to re-
duce the powers of vojvodship parliaments.
7
  
The Bulgarian reform of public administration was dominated by a centralist poli-
cy approach, originating from the fact that the post-socialist Bulgarian Socialist 
Party won the free parliamentary elections of 1990/1994 and managed to stay in 
power until 1997. The successive Bulgarian governments were pre-occupied with 
the deteriorating economic crisis and did not show an inclination to transfer pow-
ers to regions which bore the risks of political disintegration and obstruction (cf. 
Borissova in this volume; Jepson 1995).  
As a distinctive feature of a localist approach and liberal political ideas, the notion 
of municipalities forming regions by means of their voluntary association has 
played a role in most of the countries of this study. These associations were 
founded by the newly established local self-governments in order to pool their 
resources and represent common interests vis-a-vis the government and the state 
administration. The Klaus government referred to the notion of a bottom-up re-
gionalisation (see above), and in Hungary the Alliance of Free Democrats pro-
posed to replace counties by voluntary associations of local self-governments 
(Navracsics 1996: 292). Yet none of the CEE governments decided to transform 
municipal associations into regional bodies of self-government. The available em-
pirical evidence supports the impression that voluntary associations of municipali-
ties attained a political strength and influence only in Slovakia and Estonia. The 
Czech Association of Towns and Communities has, according to Davey (1995: 
49-50), "not achieved the continuity, cohesion and professionalism" of the Slovak 
association. The National Association of Territorial Self-Governments in Hungary 
has confined itself to the functions of interest representation and professional con-
sulting for local self-governments.  
The Slovak Association of Towns and Villages, its regional associations and the 
Slovak Union of Towns attained a more political role because they either became 
arenas of power struggles between the Mečiar government and the opposition or 
were mobilised to resist the centralisation policies of the Mečiar government. On-
ly Estonia’s administrative reform has assigned the regional associations of mu-
nicipalities a role as partners of counties which are integral bodies of state admin-
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  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 10 October 1998. 
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istration (cf. Janikson in this volume). This may be explained by the strong influ-
ence of liberal ideas in Estonia, the absent legacy of dualism, the influence of 
Scandinavian models, a consensual political culture and also by the small size of 
the country which reduced the need for a separate intermediate tier of self-
government. Contrary to Bulgaria, the lack of regional self-government in Estonia 
is thus more due to these causal factors than a result of a centralist policy ap-
proach. 
 
A second cleavage between a dualist and a monist policy approach can be identi-
fied if the focus is laid on the relations between regional and local self-
governments on the one hand, territorial and sectoral state administration on the 
other. A (strictly) dualist model of public administration envisages that local and 
regional self-governments carry out only their own (genuine) tasks. The role of the 
territorial state administration is restricted to a legal supervision of self-
government activities, units of sectoral and territorial state administration are in-
stitutionally separated from the self-governments. In a monist model of public 
administration, local and regional self-governments carry out their own tasks and 
those tasks of territorial state administration which are delegated to them, but fall, 
according to constitutional or legal provisions, under the competence of state ad-
ministration. State administrative bodies exercise a legal and professional supervi-
sion over the delegated tasks. The distinction points two the trade-off between 
vertical and horizontal integration: a dualist administrative set-up implies a 
stronger vertical integration but may lead to segmentation into sectoral ministries, 
agencies and their respective administrative hierarchies. A monist model allows 
for a better horizontal integration of administrative units but may entail a reduc-
tion of professional control hierarchies (cf. Goetz/Hesse 1993: 304).  
After the political transition, many governments chose a dualist approach of ad-
ministrative reform in order to abandon the state tutelage of local self-
governments and pre-dominance of sectoral policies over regional concerns. An-
other argument was that the separation of state administration and self-
government would avoid the subsidising of self-governments from the state budg-
et and separate the management of public companies from the supervision of these 
companies. Supporters of a far-reaching decentralisation or regionalisation often 
preferred a monist approach in order to ensure that comprehensive powers of local 
and regional state administration be transferred to self-governments. They consid-
ered separation as a veiled strategy of preserving old administrative hierarchies. In 
the view of dualists, a transfer of state administrative powers would lead to an 
even stronger supervisory role of the state since the state would have to ensure 
uniform administrative standards throughout the country. 
With respect to the monism-dualism cleavage, reform outcomes are hard to classi-
fy unambiguously. In their comparison of local self-governments in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Baldersheim et al. concluded that "Hun-
gary and Slovakia are characterised by a fairly strict separation of state and munic-
ipal functions and organisations. There is one set of organisations for local self-
government functions and another for local state functions. Poland and the Czech 
Republic have fused hierarchies, i.e. the organs of local self-government also per-
form some local state functions." (Baldersheim et al. 1996: 41) Davey (1995: 49-
50) observed a difference between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the fact 
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that Czech district offices continued to supervise most deconcentrated bodies, and 
district offices had closer relations with local self-governments than in Slovakia. 
Yet the Hungarian model does not seem to be a case of ”strict separation” in so far 
as Hungarian mayors carry out tasks of the state administration, too. 
As it has been stated in the previous section, regional bodies of sectoral and terri-
torial state administration have been more integrated into self-governments in Po-
land than in the Slovak and Czech Republics. Hungary and Estonia seem to have 
maintained a basically dualist structure while trying to improve co-ordination be-
tween self-governments and state administration - through the Hungarian county-
level Regional Development and Employment Councils and the Estonian Regional 
Development Agency (cf. Bende-Szabó and Janikson in this volume; Pálné Ko-
vács 1997b). Yet one has to emphasise that reforms are still in progress in most of 
the countries and there is not enough detailed information on many countries. 
Concerning the district level state administration, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic have hitherto maintained their separate bodies of territorial state 
administration. This feature would be a typical trait of a dualist model of public 
administration. In contrast, Estonia and Hungary have realised models of public 
administration with a monist orientation since they have not created a separate tier 
of territorial state administration below the county level.  
 
A third distinction which has shaped differences and similarities in policy out-
comes across countries is the cleavage between federalism and unitarism. A fed-
eralist approach aims at transferring legislative powers to subnational units and 
ensuring a participation of these units at the national level. In contrast, unitarism 
would only enable the national parliament to adopt laws and would not restrict its 
powers by a second chamber representing the regions. Debates in Poland and, to a 
minor extent, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia were placed between the poles 
characterised by these approaches.  
In Poland, some supporters of decentralisation proposed to take steps towards a 
federal model by transferring certain legislative competences to vojvodship as-
semblies ("delegated legislature") and transforming the Senate into a parliamen-
tary chamber representing local self-governments (cf. Instytut Spraw Publicznych 
1997). The Sejm majority rejected these proposals by defining the Republic of 
Poland as a "unitary structure" in the new Constitution of 1997 (Art.3). General 
scepticism towards federalising the state structures caused that the reform of the 
Polish and Czech Senates was not linked to reforms of the vojvodship and kraj 
level. However, in both countries the role of the Senate within the governmental 
system has not been finally decided and thus the second chambers may become 
more closely linked to the regional or local self-governments. Slovakia might in-
troduce a second chamber deliberately to ensure a central-level representation of 
county self-governments, as Nižňanský's contribution to this volume and his re-
form proposal show.  
Regionalism 
The existence - or perceived threat - of regionalist political movements has been 
important for the political debates on regional-level administrative reforms. Theo-
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retical and analytical conceptualisations of regionalism are faced with the problem 
of delineating precise analytic terms and identifying clear cause-effect relations 
(Keating 1997). While being aware of the fluid character of regionalisms and the 
blurred boundaries between their sources, a distinction may be made between eth-
nic and historic bases of regionalism. Ethnic regionalism emerges if an ethnic 
group, whose members consider their cultural identity as distinct from that of the 
other citizens of a state, and its political organisations link their main political 
demands to a subnational territorial unit, usually the territory inhabited by the 
group. Historic regionalism presupposes a territory with a particular history dis-
tinct from the rest of the country’s territory. The current inhabitants of that region 
may not necessarily consider themselves as ethnically different from other citizens 
but they link their identity to their region’s history and articulate, through particu-
lar organisations, political demands related to their region. 
Among the countries of this study only the Czech Republic and Poland are com-
posed of subnational territorial units with a distinct history such as Moravia, Sile-
sia, Pomerania and Greater Poland. One may identify an Eastern and a Western 
historical region in Hungary (Hunnia and Pannonia), but these regions ceased to 
exist as distinct units before a modern Hungarian nation state was built in the 
course of the 19
th
 century.
8
 
After the political transition, political actors in the Czech Republic and Poland 
tried to claim regional interests and demands by referring to the historical regions. 
Moravian political movements and parties proposed to establish a regional auton-
omy in the Czech Republic but they did not succeed in the parliamentary elections 
of 1990 (Illner 1997: 45-46). In Poland, groups linked to the National Assembly of 
Self-governments proposed to establish autonomous regions shaped according to 
historical regions and to introduce federalist elements into the state structure. 
However, they were rejected by the majority of political parties which, reacting to 
these tendencies and perceived risks, reinforced the commitment to unitarism in 
Poland’s new Constitution of 1997. 
A basis for ethnic regionalism exists in those Central and East European countries 
which have a significant and politically active national minority.
9
 Among the 
countries of this study, Slovakia has an ethnic Hungarian minority amounting to 
10.8 % of its population, Bulgaria has an ethnic Turkish minority (9.4 %), and 
approximately 30.3 % of Estonia’s population are ethnic Russians. Ethnic Hungar-
ians in Slovakia are represented by three major parties which had to join into a 
coalition in 1994. Ethnic Turkish citizens of Bulgaria are articulating their inter-
ests through the Movement of Rights and Freedoms. Only few ethnic Russians in 
Estonia have citizenship and may participate in national elections; the coalition 
”Our Home is Estonia” advocates their interests in the Estonian Parliament.  
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  It should be noted that historic nation-builders in Hungary created and preserved the megye 
division as a device to avoid the emergence of this and other, ethnically based, regionalisms. 
9
  According to a classification proposed by Brunner (1996: 24-25), a state is no longer consid-
ered a homogenous nation state if the share of national minorities in the population is above 
10%. Adapting this classification for the purposes of this article, only those national minorities 
amounting to appr. 10% of the population are considered significant. The following figures are 
taken from the census data quoted in Brunner‘s book. 
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Only the ethnic Hungarian parties of Slovakia in 1996 proposed to establish an 
autonomous region covering the ethnic Hungarian settlement area along the 
Southern border of the country, being rejected by both the government and the 
other opposition parties (Brusis/ Nižňanský 1997). Although the ethnic Russian 
community in Estonia is concentrated in the North-Eastern area of the country, 
their political representatives have not developed similar concepts of territorial 
autonomy. Since ethnic Russian non-citizens may participate in local elections, 
mayors of municipalities in the North-East (in particular Narva) advocate interests 
of the ethnic Russian community (van Meurs 1999: 29). A similar pattern seems 
to prevail in Bulgaria where the ethnic Turkish community constitutes local ma-
jorities in the counties of Haskovo and Rousse but has so far refrained from articu-
lating demands for regional autonomy. 
The general weakness of regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe may be ex-
plained by the incongruence of ethnic and historic regionalism: Countries with 
significant national minorities do not have regional units with a distinct history, 
and countries with historical regions lack groups identifying themselves as ethni-
cally distinct from other citizens (see table below). The only cases among the ten 
Central and East European states are Romania, which has a particular historical 
region (Siebenbürgen) and a significant ethnic Hungarian minority, and Latvia 
with the distinct historical region of Latgale and a considerable ethnic Russian 
community. One may argue for an addition of Poland with its ethnic German mi-
nority in Silesia, but this group amounts only to appr. 0.8 % of the population and 
their representatives have not exerted a significant political influence on the out-
comes of reform. 
The incongruence of regionalisms has prevented and impeded the mobilisation of 
support for regionalist claims. Political actors have found it difficult to legitimise 
an ethnically based regional autonomy with historic reasons or, vice versa, to base 
claims derived from the historical distinctiveness of a region upon a distinct ethnic 
identity of its inhabitants.
10
 Governments did neither need to respect regionalist 
interests nor were they inclined to support regionalist mobilisation by designing 
regional units accordingly. As a consequence county territories in the countries of 
this study up to now have been designed neither according to historic regions nor 
with respect to ethnic affiliations. The disinclination towards triggering regionalist 
dynamics also led Polish and Czech governments to refrain from linking the re-
form of their second parliamentary chambers to the establishment regional self-
governments. 
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settled in the country after Latgale had lost its regional distinctiveness and nowadays the ethnic 
Russian community is spread throughout the country, mostly living in cities. 
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Ethnic and historic preconditions of regionalism 
 Historic regions since 19
th
 
century 
No modern tradition of re-
gions 
State with significant nation-
al minorities (> 10%) 
Romania, Latvia Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, 
Lithuania 
homogenous nation state 
(minorities <10%) 
Czech Republic, Poland Hungary, Slovenia 
 
3. Impact of the European Union 
Re-arrangements of regional administration in the CEEC are not only driven by 
the interest in overcoming authoritarian legacies and linking local self-
governments with central government but also by the prospect of accession to the 
European Union. This section describes the policy of the European Commission 
and discusses whether and to what extent it has affected the political choices of 
accession candidates. The available empirical evidence conveys the impression 
that other EU institutions have not played a comparable political role in the pre-
accession constellation. The Council of Europe is also neglected in this context 
due to restrictions of empirical research although it has acquired a strong profile 
with respect to administrative reforms in the CEEC. The Council has developed 
normative standards of local and regional self-government with its Charta on Lo-
cal Self-Government (1991) and its Draft Charta on Regional Self-Government 
(1997) and it has formulated political-professional assessments of the reforms (cf. 
Nižňanský and Borissova in this volume). 
The role of the European Commission needs to be analysed on the background of 
European integration which has led to a transfer of powers from the nation state to 
EU institutions, thus altering the region-centre-relationship of EU member states 
in favour of the regions (Bullmann 1994; Bullmann/Heinze 1997). Since more 
issues of relevance are being decided on the European level, regions have ad-
dressed the EU institutions directly by opening representations in Brussels, partic-
ipating in the comitology and through the Committee of Regions established by 
the Maastricht Treaty (Kohler-Koch 1998; Keating/Hooghe 1996). The Maastricht 
and the new Amsterdam Treaty also allow states to be represented in the Council 
of Ministers by ministers of sub-national governments. The European Commis-
sion has involved the regions of the current EU member states into policy deliber-
ation and formulation in order to gain their support for its policies and also in or-
der to rely on the support of regions if nation states resist a particular policy initia-
tive.  
In contrast, regions of the accession countries were neglected by EU institutions 
and the European Commission until 1997. The Commission’s White Paper of 
1995, for example, only pointed to the general necessity of administrative capaci-
ty-building but did not refer to the restructuring of administration at the regional 
level. In March 1997 a Commission expert still suggested to eschew an overtaxing 
of regional administrations by restricting the participation of prospective new 
member states to the cohesion fund which is administered only by the national 
governments (Hallet 1997: 27, 29). This reluctance was grounded in developmen-
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tal economics: If (since) reducing the huge welfare gap between EU member 
states and the accession countries is considered a priority, the catch-up process of 
the CEEC would be more accelerated by the removal of bottlenecks in the growth 
poles of a country. Backward areas could then profit from spill-over effects of 
rapid development in growth areas. In contrast, assisting backward regions would 
imply a redistribution of resources from prosperous regions and thus impede their 
development, slowing down the national economy’s growth (Hallet 1997: 25). 
However, following this suggestion and excluding new member states from the 
structural funds would have implied to negotiate a temporary exemption with the 
accession countries or to re-negotiate the general framework of structural policy. 
The Agenda 2000 did not opt for such an approach but reinforced the principle 
according to which accession candidates were to adopt the entire acquis commu-
nautaire at the moment of their accession, including all rights and obligations.
11
 
This implied that accession countries needed to improve their administrative ca-
pacities at the regional level in order to manage structural funds. Thus the Com-
mission envisaged that Phare resources be used to prepare the countries for this 
task in the framework of pre-accession structural assistance.
12
 The avis from July 
1997 and the progress report from November 1998 analysed the state of adminis-
trative reforms in each country and gave some policy advice, often veiled in an 
opaque and diplomatic language.
13
 
In its 1997 avis the Commission came to the overall assessment that Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland had sufficient administrative capacities to 
implement structural and cohesion policy in a mid-term perspective, while in Bul-
garia (97/13: 68) and Slovakia (97/20: 107) significant reforms were necessary. 
The progress report of November 1998 maintained this assessment for Bulgaria 
(98/707: 40) but gave a more differentiated assessment of Slovakia, acknowledg-
ing that the country had made some progress, though only few. According to the 
Commission's new evaluation, Estonia and Hungary had achieved limited progress 
and needed more efforts for integration into structural policy (98/705: 39) (98/700: 
40). Despite significant progress in the Czech Republic (98/708: 35) and Poland 
(98/701: 42) there were still problems ahead. 
With respect to the reform of public administration, the Commission stressed in 
its assessments that local self governments would require sufficient financial re-
sources make use of their autonomy. Czech local self-governments would still 
face difficulties in using their autonomy since two-thirds of their budget depended 
on state subsidies (97/14: 17). In Hungary the state budget also provided most of 
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  Cf. Europäische Kommission: Agenda 2000. Eine stärkere und erweiterte Union, Bulletin der 
Europäischen Union, Beilage 5/97, Luxemburg 1997, based upon KOM (1997)2000. 
12
  Cf. the pre-print version of the Agenda 2000, Band II – Mitteilung: Intensivierung der 
Heranführungsstrategie, DOC/97/7: 6. A later version of this document did not specify the use 
of the enlarged Phare budget (Europäische Kommission: Agenda 2000. Eine stärkere und er-
weiterte Union, Bulletin der Europäischen Union, Beilage 5/97, Luxemburg 1997, 59.) 
13
  Cf. Europäische Kommission: Stellungnahmen zu den Anträgen der Beitrittsländer, in: Bulletin 
der EU, Beilage 6-15/97; Regelmäßige Berichte der Kommission über die Fortschritte der Bei-
trittsländer, KOM(1998) 700-712 endg. The following references contain the year of publica-
tion, number and page of the respective document. The 1997 avis on Slovakia is referred ac-
cording to an earlier print version, the 1997 avis on Bulgaria is referred according to the Eng-
lish version. 
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the resources of local self-governments (97/6: 16). The autonomy of Polish local 
and regional governments was still restricted and should be expanded, particularly 
in its financial aspects (97/7: 17). In its 1998 progress report the Commission not-
ed that the Czech Republic had signed but not yet ratified the European Charta for 
Local Self-government (98/708: 10). The fact that local self-governments were to 
a large degree autonomous in Estonia (97/11: 16) and Hungary (97/6: 16) was 
seen as a positive achievement.  
The Commission's remarks on regional administration indicate that its preference 
appears to be democratically elected regional self-governments which possess a 
substantial financial and legal autonomy. This preference, however, is expressed 
only indirectly and implicitly. For example, the avis on the Czech Republic stated 
that the higher units of territorial self-government envisaged by the constitution 
were lacking (97/14: 72). The avis on Bulgaria expressed the expectation that 
Bulgarian counties established in January 1999 "might be granted" the right of 
self-government (97/13: 68). On the background of its general political complaints 
about the lack of democratic stability in the Slovak Republic, the Commission 
criticised that the newly established Slovak counties and districts received compe-
tences at the expense of local self-governments and its avis called upon the gov-
ernment to clarify the division of powers between deconcentrated state administra-
tion and self-governments (97/20: 17). 
The country assessments of 1997 and 1998 contain only few sentences indicating 
an opinion of the Commission on how to structure the state territory. With respect 
to Poland, the Commission recommended that the division of the state territory 
needed to be improved in order to implement structural funds (97/7: 72). Appar-
ently acknowledging what the Commission deemed as progress, its 1998 progress 
report mentioned that Estonia had initiated a reform of its territorial organisation 
(98/705: 38), Bulgaria planned to establish 28 counties (98/707: 39), Poland de-
cided to establish self-governed vojvodships and districts (98/701: 9-10), and the 
Czech Parliament decided to establish 14 regions (98/708: 9, 35). In its official 
assessments the Commission did not propose that the CEEC should structure their 
regions according to the size of average NUTS-2 regions (appr. 15700 km², 1.8 m 
inhabitants). However, Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communi-
ties, appears to have promoted such a structuration in its communication with the 
statistical offices of the accession countries (Hřích/Larischová in this volume). 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia intend to create territorial units corresponding to 
NUTS-2 units, the Czech Government has established statistical regions of 
NUTS-2 size, and the new Polish vojvodships also correspond to NUTS-2.  
The necessity of such a territorial-administrative division is questionable. Firstly, 
the CEEC are induced to create regions which are either ”oversized” in compari-
son with the countries’ territory and population and do not fit into the inherited 
traditional regional structure. Or these regions remain artificial constructions unre-
lated to the existing regions and merely designed to maximise subsidies from the 
structural funds. Secondly, it is certainly true that according to the regulation on 
structural funds NUTS-2 regions are required in the framework of structural assis-
tance for objective-1 areas with an average per-capita GDP of less than 75 % of 
the EU average.
14
 However, not all the current EU member states have stipulated 
                                                 
14
  Cf. Article 8(1), Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/93 of 20 July 1993, L193/10, and Article 5(1) 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2082/93 of 20 July 1993, L193/22. 
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NUTS-2 regions: Ireland, Denmark and Luxemburg have not created a NUTS-2 
level because Ireland’s entire territory was qualified as an objective-1 area and the 
other two countries lack eligible areas. The UK, Portugal, Sweden and Greece 
have set up NUTS-2 regions mainly for the purpose of participating in EU struc-
tural policy (Keating/Hooghe 1996: 224; Bullmann/Goldsmith/Page 1998: 135).
15
  
Summarising the assessments and statements, one may conclude that the Commis-
sion and the pre-accession framework appear to become catalysts for a process in 
which CEE regions increase their political salience. However, the Commission 
has been very cautious in its advice and has avoided to urge for a comprehensive 
regionalisation. This resembles the indirect impact the EU and the economic and 
political integration process had for the re-emergence of regions in Western Eu-
rope. 
4. Conclusion and implications 
This article has described striking similarities in the reforms of regional admin-
istration and the major factors responsible for homogenising tendencies. It has 
also highlighted major differences between the six countries studied here and 
those variables which may explain them. These differences and their explanations 
shall be summarised in the following points: 
1. Poland and the Czech Republic are the only countries with second chambers of 
parliament which have originated from their path of transition. A general rejection 
of regionalist and federalist tendencies caused that these institutions were not 
linked to the new county self-governments. 
2. Despite a common criticism of the administrative tutelage exerted by the re-
gional level, only Czechoslovak reformers decided to completely abolish the old 
regional self-governments during the re-introduction of democratically elected 
local self-governments in 1990. Among the causes for this decision are the strong 
political legitimacy of the new government, deriving from the revolutionary path 
of transition, and the commitment to liberal political ideas of a direct relation be-
tween the state and its citizens.  
3. Bulgaria and Estonia are the only countries without regional self-governments, 
reflecting a prevailing centralist policy approach in Bulgaria and an influential 
position assigned to regional associations of municipalities in Estonia. Centralist-
minded governments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have postponed the es-
tablishment of regional self-government in these countries. Stronger localist coali-
tions and the reform-socialist legacy led to the early establishment of regional self-
governments in Hungary, while political struggles and a more intensive political 
                                                 
15
  The EU exerts a kind of soft pressure on these countries to establish self-governed regions, as 
demonstrated by a recent conflict with Ireland. In 1994 the Irish Government had created eight 
statistical regions (NUTS-3) in order to participate in the EU structural policy. Since Ireland at-
tained a per-capita GDP of 75% of the EU average and did no longer qualify as an objective-1 
region, the Irish government redesigned its regions to enlarge the eligible area of the country. In 
February 1999 Eurostat rejected the inclusion of two counties into the eligible regions because 
sufficient county-level data was lacking and the regions did not have sufficient structures of 
self-government (Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 26 February 1999). 
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perception of the issues in Poland increased the time needed to negotiate a new 
administrative set-up. 
4. Estonia and Hungary do not have a district level of public administration, the 
districts in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria are part of the state admin-
istration, and Poland has just introduced self-governed districts. These differences 
may be explained by the varying size of the countries (Poland vs. Estonia), the 
varying progress of reforms (Poland vs. Bulgaria) but also by the cross-national 
differences in legacies and prevailing policy approaches. 
5. While Poland appears to have realised a far-reaching integration of sectoral and 
territorial state administration and self-governments on the regional level, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria have maintained a separation of these ad-
ministrative bodies up to now. Hungary and Estonia have tried to improve sectoral 
co-ordination between self-governments and state administration within a basical-
ly dualist structure. A plausible explanation for this difference is certainly the dif-
ferent state of reforms in each country in combination with the monism – dualism 
cleavage. A dualist approach was the initial strategy to establish autonomous local 
self-governments against a still authoritarian state administration. A monist ap-
proach aims at a more far-reaching decentralisation, after local (and regional) self-
governments have been established. The latter approach apparently has been more 
influential in Poland than in the other countries. 
The EU and the European Commission in particular have hitherto sent different 
political signals to the applicant countries with respect to the regional administra-
tive level. On the one hand, the Commission has by and large abstained from giv-
ing direct and public advice on how to structure the state territory, whether to es-
tablish elected regional self-governments and whether to divide the territory into 
regions compatible with NUTS-2. This restraint is guided by the principle that 
such questions belong to the internal affairs of EU member states and that there is 
no basis for such a regulatory intervention in the Maastricht or Amsterdam trea-
ties.  
On the other hand, the country assessments of the progress report of 1998 and the 
avis of 1997 contain formulations which suggest an EU preference for democrati-
cally elected regional self-governments with substantial financial and legal auton-
omy. This preference may be justified by the EU’s encompassing political com-
mitment to democratic stability and the rule of law in the CEEC which was ex-
pressed in the Copenhagen criteria for membership. Additional arguments for an 
active promotion of regionalisation can be derived from the general commitments 
to subsidiarity and a ”Europe of the Regions” or from the principles stipulated in 
the Council of Europe’s draft charta on regional self-government.  
However, these rationales do not legitimate a policy advocating the introduction of 
self-governmental regions which correspond to NUTS-2 in size. Such regions nei-
ther exist in all of the current EU member states, nor represent appropriate struc-
tures to support the main aims of administrative reforms in the CEEC. A pre-
accession policy with respect to the regional level should not encourage the CEEC 
to establish such regions. Instead of promoting artificial regions through semi-
official channels, the EU should clarify its own role with respect to the regions 
and develop a more transparent policy mix of demand-driven professional support 
Introduction 
21 
for the administrative reforms and clear general guidelines on the accession re-
quirements for public administration at the regional level. 
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